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A DELICATE TASK: BALANCING THE 
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AND MOTHERS 
IN PARENTAL TERMINATION 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
Catherine J. Ross 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article considers the independent liberty interests of children in foster care 
and their mothers in parental termination proceedings. Recent federal reforms 
impose a mandatory deadline for the state to terminate parental rights. That 
policy erroneously presumes that the passage of time alone establishes parental 
fault and satisfies a parent’s due process rights. It also fails to protect the 
minority of children who assert an interest in preserving a safe relationship with 
mothers who are unlikely to meet the state‘s schedule— including many 
substance abusers and victims of domestic violence. 
 
 
The conflicting interests that can arise among parents, children and the state are 
particularly pronounced when the state seeks to terminate parental rights. The 
resulting tensions have long been aggravated by the inability of the child welfare 
system to find the proper balance between two competing imperatives. The first 
requires the state to protect children who are the victims of serious abuse or neglect 
and who, it is widely understood, may suffer repeated trauma, and even death, if the 
state fails to intervene appropriately. The second imperative is to minimize the 
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 psychological and social trauma that children often suffer when the state intervenes 
to remove them from the families that have failed to meet their basic needs. 
Once a child is placed in foster care, the inexorable progress of the case will 
presumably lead to only one of two options: return to the family of origin or 
termination of parental rights followed by permanent placement in another family. 
Thus, from the time a child enters foster care the potential exists for the interests of 
child and parent to diverge dramatically. The conflicting interests of child and 
parent are often transparent from the day the case file is opened. In other instances, 
however, where the state plans simultaneously for reunification or termination of 
parental rights, the conflicting interests of child and parent are balanced against 
their potential mutual interests as the case progresses. 
No one disputes that the stakes in parental termination cases are high. Every 
current member of the Supreme Court agrees that “[flew consequences of judicial 
action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties” (M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 1996, 
p. 119). Although the cases before the Court have focused primarily on the legal 
significance and emotional devastation of termination for parents, separation from a 
parent is at least as grievous and traumatic for the children involved (Bowlby, 
1969a. b; Goldstein et al., 1996). However, the interest that a child may have in 
preserving a relationship with a neglectful parent has received short shrift in the 
wake of recent federal reforms intended to ensure permanent placements for all 
children within a short time after their entry into the foster care system. 
Modern rights theory recognizes that minors may have legal claims independent 
of their parents that extend beyond their need for nurturance as members of an 
intimate association of family members. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997 (ASFA) states “explicitly for the first time in Federal law that a child’s health 
and safety must be the paramount consideration when any decision is made 
regarding a child in the Nation’s child welfare system.” (Strengthening Abuse and 
Neglect Courts Act of 2000) In doing so, ASFA places the potential conflicts of 
interest between children and their parents (in most instances their mothers) in stark 
relief. ASFA makes permanency “in a safe and stable home, whether it be returning 
home, adoption, legal guardianship, or another permanent placement” the goal for 
all of the children who enter foster care (Executive Memorandum. 1996). In 
keeping with its laudatory goal of moving children quickly out of the child welfare 
system to some form of stability, ASFA imposed an innovative federal time line, 
intended to insure that no child lingered in foster care for a period of years. By 
making the child’s safety and development the priority. ASFA weighs the child’s 
security more heavily than the mother’s emotional needs and legal rights. 
Looking at ASFA from the perspective of children’s rights, it is hard to see any 
drawbacks to ASFA’s categorical approach as applied to the bright line cases. Like 
ASFA, this paper is not concerned with the life circumstances that may have led the 
“abusive” mother to her predicament or her actions. (In using the term “abusive,” I 
refer to the abusers whose label raises no questions — those who torture, drown, or 
  
fail even to note that a child has disappeared.) This article is instead concerned with 
those cases that lie outside bright-line labels and examines a paradox at the heart of 
recent efforts to improve the child welfare system: in their zeal to focus on the child 
in parental termination hearings, lawmakers imposed a categorical formula that 
unwittingly harms some children and mothers who are labeled “unfit” because of 
neglect. 
In the cases at the margins, those involving mothers who may or may not be 
neglectful, or who are victims in their own right, ASFA’s categorical treatment of 
mothers and children may not serve all children equally well. Unfortunately, the 
marginal cases are not rare (American Bar Association, 1993). In this paper, I aim 
to highlight a dilemma central to the child welfare system: it may not be possible to 
devise a legal principle that equitably addresses the interests of all neglected 
children and their mothers. Attempts to impose such a categorical legal principle to 
neglect cases may result in less than optimal solutions for some individual children 
and mothers, and even instances of flagrant injustice to one or both. On the other 
hand, it is incumbent upon the law, and on its theorists as well as its practitioners, to 
grapple with the hardest issues. Perhaps no issue is more difficult than the impact of 
the passage of time on the respective claims of a parent, a child and the state in the 
child welfare system. 
Section 1 of this essay reviews the separate rights claims of parents and children. 
Section 2 analyzes the key reform of ASFA, which provides that parental rights be 
terminated after a child has remained in foster care for 15 out of the preceding 22 
months. In doing so, I consider the conflicting interests of the child, the mother and 
the state, asking whether the passage of time alone is ever sufficient justification for 
terminating parental rights in light of the protections the law affords parents. 
Section 3 draws on feminist theory in considering the vital liberty interests and 
practical needs of mothers and children in two categories of hard cases: (1) cases 
involving substance abusing mothers; and (2) cases involving battered mothers 
whose children were removed despite the mother’s success in protecting the child 
from observing or experiencing violence. Both of these categories illustrate that, in 
some instances, children’s interests might be better served by flexibility where the 
child asserts a claim to a continued relationship with a biological parent. 
 
 
1. RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES: PARENTAL LIBERTY 
INTERESTS, DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
 
The vast majority of children live with their mothers, whether in single parent 
households, with their father as well as their mother, or with their mother and her 
significant other (Fields, 2001; Fields & Casper, 2001). This necessarily means that 
where abuse or neglect takes place a mother’s role is likely to be at issue, either as a 
  
perpetrator, for placing the child in harm’s way, or for failure to protect the child 
from another adult. Indeed, when we talk about child abuse and neglect we are 
almost always talking, at some level, about mothers and their children, even if the 
mother’s partner is the abuser. 
This section first considers the constitutional rights accorded to parents, regard-
less of sex, and the ways in which those rights diminish the independent claims of 
children. It then offers a way of thinking about children’s legal claims within the 
child welfare system separate from those of their parents, with particular emphasis 
on the legal regime created by ASFA. 
The constitutional rights of parents frequently subsume the legal rights of their 
children. The Supreme Court has found a substantive liberty interest in parenting, 
which “does not evaporate simply because [the parents] have not been model 
parents or have lost temporarily the custody of their child to the State. Even when 
blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the 
irretrievable destruction of their family life” (Santosky v. Kramer, 1982, p. 753). 
The resulting legal presumption that parents speak for their children does not fully 
evaporate once the children come to attention of a child welfare agency, or even 
once a child enters foster care. Under this legal regime, as opposed to a therapeutic 
one, information must be considered in a certain order. Before a court can assume 
that the child or someone else claiming to speak for the child (such as the state or an 
appointed guardian ad litem) is in a better position than the parent to present the 
child’s best interests to the court, the court must determine that the parent has 
behaved in a way that justifies stripping the parent of her presumed identity of 
interests with her child. Only after such a finding may a court determine that the 
parent no longer speaks for this particular child. Consequently, any legislative 
initiative designed to elevate the child’s developmental needs over the rights of his 
or her parents may conflict with generally applicable constitutional principles 
protecting the family unit as a whole. It is critical, therefore, to understand the scope 
and strength of the parent’s rights before seeking to explicate the balance of 
interests between children and their parents in the context of the child welfare 
system. 
The substantive due process jurisprudence that governs claims involving a 
parent’s liberty interest in his or her child protects parents from government 
intervention absent a high threshold (Troxel v. Granville, 2000). In short, any 
infringement on the parent’s rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest (In re H. G., 2001). But while the government’s compelling interest in 
safeguarding children is rarely questioned, the means the government uses to 
achieve its goals are frequently the subject of litigation (Ross, 2000). 
The liberty interest of parents in their children also mandates procedural pro-
tections before a parent’s rights may be terminated. In Stanley v. Illinois (1972) the 
Supreme Court held that a state may not deprive a parent of his or her parental 
rights without an individualized determination of the parent’s fitness. Speed and 
efficiency, the Court declared, may not be allowed to run “roughshod over the 
  
important interests of both parent and child” (p. 657). In subsequent cases the 
Supreme Court examined three procedural issues that arise in termination cases: 
the right to appointed counsel, the standard of proof, and the right to an appeal. 
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) the Court held that due 
process does not require appointment of counsel for parents in all termination 
proceedings. The Lassiter opinion makes clear, however, that an appellate court 
may reverse a trial court’s decision not to appoint counsel if the decision violates 
fundamental fairness under the facts of the case. In addition, although the Court 
found that appointing counsel is not constitutionally required in all termination 
cases, the majority noted that a “wise public policy” would require appointing 
counsel for parents who cannot afford attorneys at all stages of dependency pro-
ceedings. At the time Lassiter was decided, the Court noted that thirty-three states 
and the District of Columbia provided appointed counsel for indigent parents in 
termination proceedings, and that nothing suggested that such statutes were other 
than “enlightened and wise.” Since then, “there have been substantial dynamic 
statutory and procedural developments” regarding the right to counsel in termina-
tion proceedings. As of 2002, the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that Delaware 
was one of only five states that had not “established a right for indigent parents to 
be represented by counsel at State expense in dependency and neglect proceed-
ings.... [either by statute] or as a matter of state constitutional law” (Brown v. 
Division of Family Services, 2002). 
The Supreme Court has ruminated on the high personal stakes that make termi-
nation of parental rights something more than an “ordinary civil action” resulting in 
mere loss of money” (Santosky v. Kramer, 1982. pp. 747. 756). In Santosky v. 
Kramer (1982), the Supreme Court held that in light of the stakes in termination 
proceedings, due process requires that the state support its allegations by an ele-
vated evidentiary standard — “at least clear and convincing evidence” — before it 
may “sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child” 
(pp. 747—748). 
Most recently, in M. L. B. v. S. L. J. (1996), the Supreme Court held that the due 
process and equal protection clauses mandate that a state may not deny appellate 
review to a person whose parental rights have been terminated. The Court held that 
states must provide every parent with access to the appellate courts following 
termination of parental rights regardless of the parent’s ability to pay the requisite 
costs. In considering the procedures due in a contested step-parent adoption, the   
M. L. B. majority again focused on the substantial and irreparable injury to parents 
who lose all rights to their children, as well as the potential for judicial error, in 
holding that “decrees forever terminating parental rights” fall into “the category of 
cases in which the State may not ~bolt the door to equal justice’” (p. 124). The 
Court, however, did not balance the child’s potential interests against the parent’s 
rights, and did not have before it the argument that delay — whether caused by the 
appellate process or by other contingencies — unjustly prolongs the child’s 
uncertainty about her fate. 
  
The cases from Lassiter through M. L. B. establish the parameters of the rights 
and presumptions that parents bring to termination proceedings. These constitu-
tional protections for parents are critical, especially since the fact-finding stage of a 
termination proceeding “pits the state directly against the parents” (Santosky v. 
Kramer, 1982, p. 759). At this stage, the trial court’s task is limited to determining 
whether “the natural parents are at fault.” This finding of “fault” is understood to be 
a prerequisite for the conclusion that these particular “parents are unfit to raise their 
own children.” Because it is assumed that children are generally best served by 
remaining with their parents, and a finding of fault could lead to their permanent 
removal from their parents’ care, courts presume that the interests of children 
converge with the interests of parents at legal proceedings. This presumption 
remains, even where the facts appear to clearly rebut it (Ross, 1996). In Santosky, 
for example, the parents’ interests were viewed as converging with their children’s 
despite the fact that one boy, who had been removed from his parents when he was 
only three days old, was seven when the case was argued and had never lived with 
his parents. Yet even on those facts, the Court preserved the legal fiction that 
parents and child speak with one voice, insisting “until the State proves parental 
unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous 
termination of their natural relationship”; only after the State proves parental unfit-
ness, are the interests of parent and child deemed to “diverge” (Santosky v. Kramer, 
1982, p. 760). 
The Supreme Court has expressed doubts about whether “the State constitution-
ally could terminate a parent’s rights without showing parental unfitness,” although 
it has never directly confronted the question (Santosky, 1982, p. 760). In obiter 
dicta, the Court opined that 
 
[w]e have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[if] a State were 
to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents 
and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do 
so was thought to be in the children’s best interest’ (Quilloin v. Walcott, 1978, p. 255). 
 
Notwithstanding the due process protections accorded the liberty interest of bio-
logical parents in their children, once a child enters foster care the parental rights 
and responsibilities for that child are apportioned among biological parent, foster 
parent and the state. The manner of this division resembles nothing so much as the 
proverbial bundle of sticks well known in introductory law school property classes 
reminding us of the long common law history of treating children as property. The 
bundle of sticks analogy clarifies the notion that the rights associated with owner-
ship of property can be “unbundled or disaggregated.” If the property is a bundle of 
sticks, the owner may give away one or more sticks while retaining the balance of 
the bundle. The sticks may represent temporary interests such as a particular usage 
or a term of years. As one commentator explains, a “particular piece of property 
may have multiple owners of different sticks in the bundle of rights that comprises 
full ownership. When we are asked to determine who owns a particular stick in the 
  
bundle, it may not help us to know who the ‘owner’ of the land is because owner-
ship of various sticks in the bundle may be spread among several people” (Singer, 
2001, pp. 2—3). Similarly, no matter how long a child remains in foster care, he or 
she continues to “belong” to the natural parent in some respects. That natural parent 
— although stripped of custody and day-to-day decision making once a child enters 
foster care — retains the sole ability to make decisions regarding surgery and the 
right to marry or enlist in the armed forces as a minor, among other decisions, and is 
presumed to represent the child’s legal interests, retaining what amounts to a future 
interest in the child (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and 
Reform (OFFER), 1977). 
The Supreme Court made it clear in Santosky that there is no room at the fact-
finding stage of a termination proceeding to weigh either the child’s independent 
interest or the child’s relationship with a foster family against the rights of the 
natural parents in the care, custody and nurture of their child. The focus during fact-
finding at a termination proceeding is “emphatically” not on the child, or the other 
opportunities open to the child, but only on whether “the natural parents are at 
fault” as the state alleges (Smith v. OFFER, 1977, p. 759). Even when the child 
demonstrates disinterest in the natural parents or positive attachment to current 
caregivers such as foster parents there is no room for the child’s perspective until 
the court turns to disposition. Some commentators have criticized this legal regime 
for blocking a judge’s ability to consider the child’s need for protection and safety 
outside the context of parental fault (Bartholet, 1999; Gelles & Schwartz, 1999). 
Similarly, lower courts have expressly held that while the best interests of the 
child should be paramount in all proceedings to terminate parental rights, “a court 
may not base termination of parental rights solely on the best interests of a child” 
(In re Welfare of M. H., 1999, p. 228; Meyer, 1999). In order to terminate parental 
rights, a court must first find that at least one statutory ground for termination 
exists. Consistent with the discussion in Santosky, state laws governing termination 
provide for a bifurcated analysis. First, the court must ask whether sufficient 
statutory grounds have been shown for terminating the parent’s rights (with due 
consideration to the parent’s constitutional rights). Only then may the court reach 
the second question: whether termination of parental rights in fact serves the child’s 
best interest (e.g. Minn. Stat., 2003). If the statutory grounds for termination have 
been well framed and the evidence that those grounds have been met is clear and 
convincing, the child’s best interests will normally be served by termination, par-
ticularly if the state has already identified a permanent or adoptive home for the 
child. 
In a hypothetical regime in which the child’s rights were weighed heavily, fewer 
children would be needlessly separated from their parents either temporarily or 
permanently. Fewer would be removed from borderline domestic situations, and 
fewer of those removed would spend fifteen months or more in foster care or fail to 
ever find a new permanent home. In that hypothetical regime, children’s 
attachments would also weigh in the decision to terminate parental rights. But in the 
  
real world, things are not so simple. 
Young children are not autonomous persons. The law recognizes that children 
need adults to nurture and supervise them (Minow, 1990; Woodhouse, 1993). The 
parental rights doctrine is premised in part on this notion, and the child welfare 
system is in turn based upon the view that if the biological parents prove unfit for 
the job of raising their children, the state has a compelling interest in replacing the 
failed parent with one who is up to the challenge. The state’s interest in the healthy 
development of its youngest citizens is deemed to allow the state to substitute itself 
and its representatives as the anointed spokespersons for the children in lieu of unfit 
biological parents. Children’s rights advocates emphasize the importance of being 
able to distinguish when a child’s interests converge with the parent’s, and when it 
is imperative to recognize that the needs or interests of parent and child 
substantially diverge (Ross, 1996, 1999a, b). In the context of the child welfare 
system, it may be inappropriate to assume that the child’s needs are fully 
represented by the parent’s legal claims. At the same time, it oversimplifies matters 
to presume that the interests of a child in foster care are irretrievably at odds with 
those of his or her parents. Instead, to do justice to the potentially competing claims 
of mothers and children in the child welfare system, we need to struggle to find a 
way to hear the voice of the individual child. While the voices of children of various 
ages may be treated differently because the balance of dependency and autonomy 
shifts during the process of maturation, even very young children may have ways of 
communicating about their needs (Ross, 1999a, b). 
However, once the law has assigned the designation of “parent~~ to a particular 
adult, parental rights doctrine as interpreted by Santosky dictates that the child has 
no voice separate from the parent in court until grounds for termination are 
established. Because of the importance of parental rights doctrine, courts will not 
normally substitute the child’s best interest for an analysis of parental fault. Courts 
frequently decline to weigh the unique circumstances of a child’s life, even where 
they suggest that the child’s emotional well-being would be served by taking into 
consideration factors other than parental fault, such as the child’s attachment to 
caretakers. 
This was the issue in the case of “Baby Jessica” DeBoer, who was wrongfully 
adopted at the age of 17 days, even though her father’s rights had not been termi-
nated. She was two years old and had known no parents other than her adoptive 
mother and father when Justice Stevens refused to stay the lower court’s order 
returning her to her natural parents (DeBoer v. DeBoer, 1993). Justice Stevens 
explained that no law “authorizes unrelated persons to retain custody of a child 
whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit, simply because they may be 
better able to provide for her” (p. 1302). 
In the similar and equally controversial case of “Baby Richard,” the father only 
discovered that Richard was alive 57 days after the birth, well after Richard had 
been adopted (In re Petition of Doe, 1994). Ruling that the father’s rights had been 
terminated improperly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that courts may not consider 
  
the best interests of the child before determining, as a threshold matter, that parental 
rights should be terminated. If they could, the court opined, “few parents would be 
secure in the custody of their own children” (p. 183). The corollary of this principle 
is that every child should be secure in her parents’ custody. Thus the issue in both 
cases, decided in the context of private adoption rather than of the child welfare 
system, was a profound disagreement between advocates for the children and the 
birth fathers over whether to define “parents” based on biology or on the child’s 
emotional experience (Goldstein et al., 1996). 
 
 
2. THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997 
 
The pendulum of child welfare reform has repeatedly swung between efforts to 
preserve troubled families at virtually all costs and a passion to rescue every child in 
need. At the height of a prevailing but oversimplified interpretation of family 
preservation in the mid- 1990s, about half-a-million children were in foster care 
because they had been “rescued” and were waiting for their parents to be rehabil-
itated so that they could return home. In many of these situations, the facts made 
clear that the faster children were unlikely ever to rejoin their biological parents. 
Although foster care was designed as a temporary expedient and was administered 
as if it were in fact temporary, increasing numbers of children were spending three 
years or more in foster care, many of them in a series of homes. This phenomenon 
became known as “foster care drift” (H. R., 1997, p. 2740). About one-third of the 
children in foster care would never return home. (Duquette & Hardin, 1999). 
Instead, many of these children grew up in a series of foster homes and institutions, 
languishing for years in a child welfare system that moved at a “glacial pace” 
(Gordon. 1999, p. 649). At the same time, publicity focused awareness on several 
egregious cases of children who had been returned to their families, only to die at 
the hands of a parent. 
Eventually, the increasingly widespread perception that the foster care system 
was out of control and hurting children led to a congressional search for uniform 
solutions based on the child’s need for safety, nurturance and permanency (Gendell, 
2001). ASFA, enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support, proclaimed “two 
basic goals: [p]reventing children from being returned to unsafe homes, and finding 
safe and loving and permanent homes for children who cannot be reunited with 
their families” (143 Cong. Rec. H2017, 1997). 
Like other child welfare reform efforts since the 1970s, ASFA drew heavily on 
the child development principles set forth in the influential work of Joseph 
Goldstein, Albert Solnit, and Anna Freud (Gordon, 1999). These principles include 
consideration of: (1) the child’s need for parental continuity — an adult who serves 
as the child’s “psychological parent”; (2) the importance of instilling in the child the 
feeling of being safe, protected and loved; and (3) the child’s compressed sense of 
  
time and the concomitant urgency of resolution (Goldstein et al., 1996). Above all, 
the leading interpreters of ASFA called on those charged with applying the law to 
look at the foster care system “through the eyes of the child” (Duquette & Hardin, 
1999, p. 1-7). 
ASFA’s proponents urged careful consideration of the child’s perspective 
because they were aware that the interests of parents and children do not always 
mesh (Gordon, 1999). Several members of Congress expressly stated that the 
balance between children’s and parents’ rights had to shift under ASFA. As one 
commentator has noted, putting children first is “often ‘difficult and painful.’ It is 
difficult because adults do not have children’s needs and cannot easily see what 
they are. It is painful because what is good for children may be unfair to adults” 
(Gordon, 1999, p. 657). Congress made clear that where it was not possible to be 
equally “fair” to children and their parents, ASFA requires courts to elevate the 
interests of the child over those of the parent. 
The effort to focus on children’s needs was embodied in the Act’s key provision, 
which provides that in order to retain federal funding, the state “shall” move to 
terminate parental rights with the goal of adoption or another form of permanent 
placement in two categories of cases: (I) cases where it is apparent early on that the 
child cannot safely return home because of “aggravated circumstances,” such as 
torture or a felony assault; and (2) all cases involving children who “have been in 
foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months” 
(the “15/22 months rule”). In legal parlance, “shall” means that the directive is 
mandatory. The statute provides only three exceptions to the requirement that the 
state initiate termination proceedings. The 15-month deadline does not apply when: 
(1) the child is in kinship foster care; (2) the state can demonstrate to the court a 
“compelling reason” why such a petition would not serve the child’s best interests; 
or (3) the state has failed to provide the services which its own case plan “deems 
necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home.” 
Generally, the aggravated circumstances cases are not complex in terms of either 
law or morality. The facts of those cases are so heinous that line-drawing should not 
prove difficult. In cases involving “aggravated circumstances” the parent has 
already put the child’s life at risk. In contrast, the cases in the second group are not 
so straightforward. With the passage of time, termination becomes more and more 
likely, and the needs all children have for stability and permanence are pitted 
directly against the claims of their parents. ASFA establishes a presumption that, 
after 15 months have passed, all children are better off if their parental rights are 
terminated. 
In many, or even most instances, ASFA’s reforms promote the actual needs of 
the individual child. Unfortunately, the complexities of child welfare cases are not 
always amenable to such an easy categorical fix, as will be demonstrated in Section 
3. As a result, if states consistently apply the statute as written, ASFA may 
unwittingly place the claims of the state in conflict with the demonstrable needs of 
at least some fraction of children. 
  
In addition to enunciating the “15/22 months” legal rule, the Act imposes 
specific accelerated time lines for court proceedings designed to guarantee the child 
a permanent placement, whether with the natural parents or somewhere else. ASFA 
thus requires that a court conduct a permanency hearing “no later than 12 months 
after the date the child is considered to have entered foster care.” This section of 
ASFA squarely raises the question raised in Santosky and left unanswered by the 
Supreme Court for 35 years: is the passage of time sufficient to establish a level of 
parental “fault” that satisfies the due process clause for the purposes of irrevocably 
terminating a mother’s right to her child? 
The remaining sections of this article consider the interplay between the time line 
and the respective rights of parents and children — rights that can either be 
mutually reinforcing, or may stand in direct conflict. 
 
 
2.1. The Mere Passage of Time 
 
Federal law creates an implicit presumption that a parent who allows a child to 
linger in foster care for 15 months is unfit. By virtue of this assumption, in an effort 
to place the child’s presumptive interests front and center, the Act sidestepped the 
essential legal question of how the state would establish legally sustainable grounds 
for termination in light of the court’s obligation to consider the rights of the parent 
in their child. 
By the end of 1999, every state and the District of Columbia had amended local 
statutes in an effort to comply generally with ASFA (U.S. Gen. Accounting Office 
(G.A.O.), 1999). Illinois reconciled the standard of “unfitness” with the 15/22 
months rule by revising its statutes to provide, in part, that a parent may be found 
unfit if, pursuant to a court order, “a child has been in foster care for 15 months out 
of any 22 month period” (750 Ill. Comp. Stat., 1998). in re H. G. (2001), the only 
reported case to date considering the due process implications of the 15/22 months 
rule, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned the section of the state’s Adoption Act 
creating this new ground of parental unfitness based on the length of time a child 
has remained in foster care. 
As summarized by the court, the facts of the case are not atypical. Illinois 
removed H. G. from her mother’s custody in March of 1996 because of neglect. The 
state alleged that the mother had violated a protective order by allowing H. G. to see 
her father, and had grabbed H. G.’s arm on two occasions, causing it to dislocate. H. 
G. entered foster care. Nine months later, in December of 1996, the court placed H. 
G. in the legal custody of the state and ordered the mother to participate in a variety 
of services, including obtaining appropriate housing, participating in therapy, and 
completing parenting classes. The record offers no indication of the relationship 
between the mother’s housing and the allegations of neglect, nor does it indicate 
what services, if any, the state offered the mother in any of these three areas. 
In August 1998, 20 months after the trial court’s dispositional order and 29 
  
months (or two and a half years) after H. G. was removed from her home, the state 
filed a petition for termination of the mother’s rights. The petition alleged that the 
mother was unfit because she had failed either to make “reasonable efforts to 
correct the conditions which were the basis for removal” or to make reasonable 
progress toward reunification. Trial was originally scheduled for March, 1999, but 
seven months of continuances, some initiated by the state, followed. 
In October 1999, 14 months after the state filed its petition for termination, 34 
months after the original disposition order, and 43 months after H. G. entered the 
foster care system, the state filed an amended petition to terminate parental rights, 
this time adding an allegation that the mother was unfit because H. G. had been in 
foster care for 15 out of the preceding 22 months. Another series of continuances 
postponed the trial date to the end of January 2000. By its own terms, ASFA (as 
Illinois implemented it) failed H. G. dismally. When the termination hearing finally 
began, she had been in foster care for more than three years, more than the average 
length of time that children spent in foster care before ASFA became law. 
H. G.’s mother challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated her due 
process and equal protection rights because it is “not narrowly tailored to achieve its 
manifest purpose, improperly shifts the burden of proof to a respondent parent, and 
improperly invites consideration of best interest issues at the fitness portion of a 
termination hearing$’ in violation of the holding in Santosky (In re H. G., 2001, p. 
873). The trial court ruled for the mother on all three grounds, stating “[t]he 
problem is inherent in that this particular statute, unlike all of the other provisions 
for finding unfitness, relates not to conduct of a parent or an internal flaw of 
character or behavior or mental illness or physical infirmity, but rather the mere 
passage of time” (p. 868). The Illinois Supreme Court expressly rejected the state’s 
argument that “a fit parent does not allow his or her child to languish in foster care 
for 15 months” (p. 871). The court correctly pointed out that the case before it 
“aptly illustrate[s]” that, “in many cases, the length of a child’s stay in foster care 
has nothing to do with the parent’s ability or inability to safely care for the child 
but, instead, is due to circumstances beyond the parent’s control” (p. 872). It 
continued, 
 
[because there will be many cases in which children remain in foster care for the 
statutory period even when their parents can properly care for them.., the presumption 
contained in [the statute] is not a narrowly tailored means of identifying parents who 
pose a danger to their children’s health or safety (p. 873). 
 
In summary, the court stated, “[wie decline to recognize that the State has a 
compelling interest in removing children from foster care in an expeditious fashion 
when that removal is achieved in an unconstitutional manner” (p. 874). 
Clarity about legal standards and zealous protection of procedural rights is par-
ticularly important in termination cases because a profound imbalance of power 
permeates the relationship between a mother and the state. This imbalance not only 
dominates the day-to-day dealings of the parties, it also allows the state to play a 
  
large role in crafting the record that a court ultimately reviews in most, if not all, 
cases. As the Supreme Court has observed, because “the child is already in agency 
custody” in most termination proceedings “the State even has the power to shape 
the historical events that form the basis for termination,” thus increasing the risk of 
erroneous fact-finding (Santosky v. Kramer, 1982, p. 763). 
If the agency drags its feet and fails to provide the parent with needed resources 
and support, fifteen months are likely to be consumed without any discernable 
change in the parent’s circumstances. In addition, while the mother often lacks legal 
representation during much, if not all of the process, the child welfare agency is 
represented by counsel from the inception of its relationship with the mother. 
Because she lacks legal representation, the mother may be intimidated, inarticulate 
or confused. Consequently, she may “consent” to a course of action from which it is 
hard to extricate herself (such as “voluntary” placement under threat of coerced 
removal of her children). Equally important, caseworkers keep written records of 
the mother’s attitude, behavior and compliance, all of which can be introduced as 
evidence at a termination hearing. Because the caseworker has significant leeway to 
describe the mother as he or she sees fit in those records, the caseworker wields 
enormous power. In addition, it may prove difficult or impossible to correct even 
factual errors in the record (Lassiter v. Dep ‘t of Social Services, 1981) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). As one federal judge concluded, “the damage to constitutional rights 
is accomplished in the many months preceding the opportunity for final judicial 
disposition” (Nicholson v. Williams, 2002, p. 215). The mutual interests of a mother 
and child who should be reunited can be compromised by the state’s incompetence 
and its control of the narrative presented to the court at the end of 15 months. 
But the child is also at risk when the state simply ignores the federal requirement 
that it act in timely fashion. Preliminary reports suggest that many states are failing 
to move to terminate when a child has been in foster care for 15 out of the last 22 
months (G.A.O., 2002). Even when states seek termination on the ground that too 
much time has passed, courts may refuse to grant the state’s petition because the 
state has failed to set forth legally cognizable grounds. The extent of noncompliance 
is unknown, in large part because the federal government does not collect data on 
how often states use the 15/22 month rule to trigger a termination proceeding. 
Sparse data from a handful of states suggests that the rule focuses state agencies on 
the passage of time, but that it has not changed agency protocol. Officials report that 
they fail to seek termination after 15 months as required under ASFA for a variety 
of reasons, including a shortage of viable permanent homes for the children. 
Anecdotal reports suggest that state agencies simply fail to file for termination 
rather than triggering one of the statutory exemptions by demonstrating to a court 
that “compelling reasons” exist not to seek termination. 
However, the suspicion that agencies or judges may not enforce the 15/22 month 
rule does not diminish the urgency of the doctrinal questions presented by ASFA’s 
mandatory time line. If states are to comply with ASFA, they will need to draft 
statutes that offerjudges constitutionally sound rationales for terminating a parent’s 
  
rights after 15 months. 
 
 
2.2. Three Statutory Models 
 
Despite the clear risks to children that accumulate with the length of time in the 
child welfare system, less than one-third of all states have even attempted to craft a 
statutory rationale for terminating parental rights (absent other statutory grounds for 
termination) after a child has been in foster care for 15 of the preceding 22 months. 
In many states, the reference to 15/22 months (or, in some instances, a shorter 
period) is found only in the section on definitions, or in the section on when a 
termination petition should be filed, and the passage of time is not addressed in the 
portion of the code that spells out the grounds for terminating parental rights. A 
handful of states do not appear to have incorporated any reference to the 15/22 
month period set forth in ASFA in their legal code. These include Florida, Hawaii, 
Michigan, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont. 
The states that have tackled the drafting problem so far have tended to use one of 
three approaches: (1) the prima facie case;1 (2) the rebuttable legal presumption or 
“res ipse loquitur” approach;2 and (3) the “predictive” approach, based on 
evaluations of future parental capacity and behavior. 
The first approach (which I call the “prima facie case”), exemplified by the 
statute overturned in Illinois and a similar (as-yet untested) provision in South 
Carolina (S.C. Code Ann., 1998) makes the placement of a child in foster care for 
15 out of 22 months prima facie proof of parental unfitness and thus an independent 
ground for termination. The surface advantage of this approach is obvious. It 
enables lawmakers and judges to circumvent the logjam at the heart of ASFA which 
is created by the conflict between two legal principles: placing the child’s best 
interests first, on the one hand, and the constitutional imperative not to disrupt the 
parent-child relationship unless strict legal standards have been satisfied, on the 
other. 
The second approach (which I call the “res ipse loquitur” approach) is similar, 
but allows some flexibility. Under this regime, if a child has been in foster care for 
15 of the preceding 22 months, the law establishes a presumption that the best 
interests of the child will be served by termination of parental rights (e.g. Mont. 
Code Ann., 2001). This resembles the approach in tort law that under certain 
conditions, if one party has been injured (the child) then another party (the parent) 
must have been negligent, and thus blameworthy. The presumption is that 
remaining in foster care for 15 out of 22 months causes injury to the child and this 
serves as evidence of unfitness, because a fit parent would have regained custody of 
the child in that period of time. Whatever the initial harm to the child may have 
been, this formulation makes the child’s continuing presence in foster care an on-
going harm attributable to the parent rather than to the state. The res ipse loquitur 
approach makes a useful conceptual contribution. It helps to focus the court’s 
  
attention on the harms the child has experienced both in the parent’s custody and as 
a consequence of the child’s prolonged stay in foster care. The shift in emphasis 
from the rights of the parent to the needs of the child is exactly what ASFA 
intended. 
But even though the res ipse loquitur presumption is expressly or implicitly 
rebuttable, it shares some of the infirmities found in the Illinois law at issue in H. G. 
Once the plaintiff (the child, represented by the state) has established by 
circumstantial evidence that reasonable persons could conclude that the injury was 
caused by parental negligence, the parents’ defense relies on a strong showing of an 
alternative explanation, which the parents may not be able to establish (Keeton etal., 
1984). 
The third, and most promising, approach requires that the court predict the 
likelihood that the parent will be a fit or unfit parent for this child in the near future. 
The statutes that adopt a predictive approach require the court to evaluate both the 
extent to which the state has provided the parent with rehabilitative programs and 
other opportunities to meet the state’s demands, and the parent’s efforts to address 
the state’s concerns while the child has been in foster care. In Connecticut, for 
example, the statute expressly provides a ground for termination where the child has 
been in the custody of the state for 15 of the 22 preceding months and 
 
the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the 
child to the parent.., and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would 
encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, 
such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child (Conn. Gen. Stat., 2003). 
 
The statute reins in judicial discretion by requiring that in all cases where parents 
oppose termination of their rights, the trial court shall make written findings 
regarding seven factors: (1) the services offered to the parent; (2) the extent to 
which the state and the parents fulfilled the terms of any applicable court order; (3) 
the child’s significant emotional ties with the parents or any other guardian in 
whose care the child has been for at least twelve months; (4) the child’s age; (5) the 
parent’s efforts to address the conditions which led to the child’s removal; (6) the 
parent’s visitation with the child while the child was in out-of-home placement; and 
(7) the extent, if any, to which the parent’s effort to maintain a relationship with the 
child were constrained by unreasonable acts on the part of any other person or by 
the parent’s economic circumstances. This standard respects the parents’ rights to a 
meaningful opportunity to regain their children. At the same time, it allows the 
court to take the child’s sense of the passage of time into account, and to weigh it 
heavily against the parent’s plea for more time to attempt rehabilitation. The 
approach is premised on the view that children cannot tolerate prolonged delay 
while their parents relapse into harmful behavior. As one trial court put it, “children 
cannot afford to spend the rest of their childhood waiting for their father and mother 
to also grow up” (State Dep ‘t of Human Resources v. A. K., 2002, p. 9). 
The child’s age is a particularly important factor because it affects the child’s 
  
sense of time, as well as the depth of the relationship between the child and the 
biological parent and the child’s memory of that relationship. The infant placed at 
birth will obviously have no experience with her biological mother, and may have a 
well-developed relationship with a foster family, while the 14-year-old may have 
positive feelings toward her mother, and regard the foster family as a recent 
intrusion. Equally important, if the state terminates the biological mother’s parental 
rights to a 14-year-old, she is likely to become a “legal orphan,” a child who is 
legally free for adoption but for whom the state cannot find an adoptive home 
(Guggenheim, 1995). Many adolescents who graduate from foster care turn to their 
biological families for support. If the parental rights of the biological parent have 
been terminated, legal services lawyers report, teenagers “often come back and say 
to us, ‘You know, I want that termination vacated because I want to have a 
connection with my biological family”’ (Drinane, 2000, p. 444). But ASFA does 
not distinguish between infants and teenagers in mandating termination after 15 
months. 
Courts also face the limitations of the case record in determining parental “fault” 
and in attempting to predict whether a child can be safe with that parent in the 
future. According to the American Psychological Association, specific evidence of 
past behavior is the best basis for prediction of future behavior (Gerbasi et al., 
2000). Records in termination cases are replete with evidence of past behavior on 
which to premise predictions of future parenting behavior. There is, however, no 
easy checklist that agencies and courts can rely upon in their effort to predict 
whether a child can be safe with his or her parents. As psychologists explain, 
“[e]ach case is unique, often involving complex and confusing facts, and the stakes 
— the safety and welfare of a child — are very high” (Freitag & Wordes, 2001). 
A modification of the predictive approach emphasizes the extent to which pre-
diction is based on past acts for which the parent may equitably be held responsible. 
In Minnesota, for example, the statute provides for termination of parental rights on 
the grounds that the child “is neglected and in foster care” (Minn. Stat., 2003). This 
ground for termination applies to children who have been placed in foster care by 
court order, who cannot currently be returned to their parents, and “whose parents, 
despite the availability of needed rehabilitative services, have failed to make 
reasonable efforts to adjust their circumstances, condition or conduct....” The court 
is directed to make findings regarding how long the child has been in foster care, as 
well as about the parent’s efforts to rehabilitate and to maintain contact with the 
child, and whether the state offered reasonable services to the parent. The last two 
factors attempt to focus the court on parental behavior while the child has been in 
foster care rather than on the mere passage of time. 
In contrast to Minnesota’s adaptation, ASFA sidesteps the relationship between 
the passage of 15 months in foster care and the constitutional imperative that the 
state must establish parental fault. In circumventing the constitutional requirement 
that the state prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence before 
terminating parental rights, the law does a disservice to both parents and children. 
  
Children who have been in foster care for fifteen months or more, who are not 
likely to return home safely in the near future, and for whom a permanent home has 
been identified should be able to take advantage of ASFA and be legally adopted 
and integrated into new families. But if the state fails to come to grips with its 
burden to prove parental unfitness, it may wrongfully deprive parents and children 
of a legally protected relationship that is beneficial to the children and unwittingly 
subject such children to continuing uncertainty in the form of a lengthy appeals 
process. 
In order for ASFA’s 15/22 month provision to survive wider appellate scrutiny, 
the state (including both the child welfare and court systems) bears the onus of 
keeping each case on schedule in accordance with the statute’s time lines and of 
insuring that parents receive the services they need. If the state were to accomplish 
these goals, any efforts to terminate parental rights in neglect cases would 
necessarily be based on allegations of persistent unfitness despite opportunities to 
change and not merely the passage of time. The burden on the state promotes the 
child’s legal and developmental interests as well as the parent’s rights because the 
child may not be well served by an unnecessary permanent separation from a parent 
whom the child regards as his or her primary caretaker. 
In addition to the individual children whose unique histories indicate that they 
should not be severed from their parents, there are identifiable and predictable sub-
classes of children who should not be permanently separated from their mothers 
based solely on the clock running out at fifteen months. Examples of these 
circumstances are the focus of the next section. 
 
 
3. “BAD” MOTHERS: HARD CATEGORIES,  
HARDER CASES 
 
When the abusive or neglectful parent who asserts a liberty interest and the 
concomitant procedural protections is a mother, an additional array of issues 
emerges. These include problematic, essentialist definitions of “woman” and 
“mother” that are loaded with normative assumptions. Essentialism refers to the 
notion that all women share a common experience or nature, and are characterized 
by common attributes and that those who fail to live up to the ideal are flawed as 
women (Chamallas, 2003). To be a woman is to be a current, past or potential 
mother, regardless of individual choice or actual condition (Fineman, 1995). To be 
a mother is normatively to be a “good” mother, so that the adjective need not even 
be stated. A “mother” by default is the normative mother, a socially constructed 
image that encapsulates many presumptions — especially those of a woman who is 
middle-class, married, and a caretaker. In this view, only the unusual, deviant 
mother requires a prefatory adjective: “single,” “working,” “welfare,” or “bad.” In 
reality, as some feminist scholars have pointed out, an infinite variety of women 
  
and mothers exist (Murphy, 1998; Williams, 2000). Reported opinions in 
proceedings to terminate parental rights offer an enormous range of portraits of 
mothers. Women who have abused, neglected, or failed to protect their children 
may be single, married, cohabiting or divorced. 
Despite the ease with which we can locate these mothers in the real world, for a 
long time feminist theory “largely ignored ‘bad mothers’ and their implications for 
child abuse” (Ashe & Cahn, 1993, p. 76). This silence may reflect a defensive 
mechanism exercised by feminists in legal practice either because they are reluctant 
to believe that their clients had “beaten, struck, or kicked their children,” or because 
those realities are so difficult to “understand or interpret” (Ashe & Cahn, 1993, pp. 
79, 109). Feminist scholars in turn skirted the issue because the facts did not mesh 
with an early feminist meta-narrative of women as victims (Woodhouse, 1999). 
Recently, however, feminist scholars have increasingly recognized that “women are 
not only victims.., they are often guilty themselves as agents who abuse children or 
fail to protect them” (Becker, 1995, p. 13). 
Women may abuse power and fail to protect their children in two distinguishable 
ways (Becker, 1995). In the first, the woman herself is the agent of aggressive or 
passive acts that harm her children. In the second, the woman’s liability stems from 
her failure to protect her children from abuse or neglect at the hands of third party. 
In this second category, feminist theory suggests the importance of clearly 
distinguishing the acts and omissions attributable to the mother from those of the 
primary source of the harm (commonly the child’s father or the mother’s male 
companion). Just as feminist scholars have highlighted the injustices wrought by the 
traditional legal presumption that a man and his wife were a single legal unit for 
purposes of spousal violence (Anderson, 2003), SO too must contemporary courts 
learn to distinguish when mothers can and cannot be held accountable for the 
actions of the men in their lives. Women who know that a particular person 
threatens their child’s safety and nevertheless fail to protect the child from 
predictable or on-going harm, however, transform themselves into agents of abuse. 
For example, it is widely understood that the mother who refuses to leave a man 
who she learns is sexually abusing her daughter is not a safe custodian for that child 
(Appell, 1999; Venier, 2000). 
The context in which events occur and individuals make decisions is frequently 
overlooked in child welfare decision-making even though it is transparently clear 
that some mothers cannot muster the resources to protect their children without 
help. One of the major insights of contemporary feminism is particularly apt with 
reference to the child welfare system: it is necessary to deconstruct the gender and 
class neutrality of laws in order to reveal alternative accounts of power and reality 
(Smart, 1989). In context, victimization and social structures contribute to the 
determination of which women regain their children from the child welfare system 
and which women lose them forever. Extreme poverty in the face of a lack of 
services, single parenthood and race all contribute to both initial intervention and 
ultimate removal of children (Pelton, 1998; Ramsey, 2003). For this reason, ASFA 
  
envisions preventive services that are adequate to eliminate unnecessary removals. 
Current federal law retains the prevention and reunification provisions that were 
enacted as part of the Child Welfare Act of 1980. ASFA modifies the “reasonable 
efforts” provisions of the 1980 Act by providing that some small proportion of 
children have been hurt so badly, and some parents are so clearly incapable of 
transformation, that in those cases, time and resources should not be wasted on 
fruitless efforts that disserve children who will never go home. In order to move 
those children into new permanent homes more swiftly, ASFA defines the “aggra-
vated circumstances” which eliminate the requirement that the state make “rea-
sonable efforts” to preserve the family. In all other instances, ASFA as integrated 
with pre-existing laws requires that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve 
and reunify families.” “Reasonable efforts” include providing services that would 
“prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the child’s home,” as 
well as services following removal “to make it possible for a child to safely return 
to the child’s home” (Child Welfare Act of 1980). 
Consistent with its vision of termination after a child has remained in foster care 
for 15 months, however, ASFA specifies that the state is no longer obligated to 
provide services to the family after the expiration of the 15 month period. By 
allowing the state to curtail services for the mother after a child has been in foster 
care for 15 months (regardless of when the mother actually began to receive the 
services), ASFA may exacerbate the constitutional infirmities of the 15/22 months 
rule as viewed from the perspective of the parent’s rights. Some states do not even 
wait 15 months before cutting off services. Utah, for example, will not provide 
reunification services for more than one year for children over three years of age, 
and makes services available for only eight months where children under age three 
are involved (Utah Code Ann., 2003). 
Persistent complaints about the lack of funding for preventive services support 
the view that poverty continues to provoke the separation of children and parents 
(Ramsey, 2003). The label of neglectful parent is skewed by class, race, culture and 
ethnicity from the point of reporting and investigation through removal and 
termination (Bartholet, 1999; Roberts, 2002; Ross &Cahn, 2000). Totheextentthat 
child welfare agencies or courts view some mothers as neglectful based primarily 
on cultural differences or poverty, a family’s failure to conform to an idealized 
notion of middle class life does not constitute a legitimate basis for removing a 
child. 
For example, Adriana Recodo escaped from an abusive domestic relationship but 
had no income, no place to live and no transportation. When she sought help from a 
social worker, she received a referral to a psychologist and her son entered foster 
care. Recodo was studying for her G.E.D. and seeking employment. She could not 
find stable housing, but the state did not provide her with housing assistance. Her 
parental rights were terminated due to “chronic instability” in her employment and 
housing (Recodo v. State, 1997). When the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the 
termination, a pointed dissent put Recodo’s case in the context of other termination 
  
cases that had reached the state’s highest court, concluding that “the State’s modus 
operandi appears to be to go into the homes of handicapped, powerless and usually 
very poor parents, remove their children.., and put the children into the home of 
substitute parents who are more affluent than the natural parents and more pleasing 
to social service agents than the natural parents” (p. 1136). 
Yet the relationship between poverty and entrance into foster care should not be 
surprising. It is inseparable from our society’s public expectations and legal norms 
concerning the privatization of caretaking (Fineman, 1999). The denial of collective 
responsibility for caretaking in favor of norms that emphasize autonomy and self-
reliance deprives caretakers of the social, financial and government support that 
many of them desperately need (Fineman, 1998). The institution of foster care itself 
may be understood as a substitution of one private caretaking unit for another, albeit 
with a small government subsidy (Ross & Cahn, 2000). The children of neglectful 
parents would benefit greatly from a more sensitive filtering system, in which 
neglect that does not result in serious harm or danger would trigger benefits in the 
form of services, rather than potentially unwarranted removal (Goldstein et al., 
1997). 
Poverty can also interfere with a parent’s ability to reclaim children who have 
entered foster care. In New York City, for example, public interest lawyers report 
that the shortage of available apartments for low income parents means that a 
significant number of parents remain separated from their children solely because 
they lack adequate housing (Kaufman, 2004). While children are in foster care they 
do not count as members of their mother’s household. The mother does not receive 
public benefits which she might otherwise get, and cannot claim that the children 
live with her when she applies for a larger apartment in subsidized housing. The 
mother finds herself in a closed system where she cannot regain her children unless 
she has enough space, and she cannot get enough space unless she has possession of 
her children. 
A range of other problems common to parents whose children enter foster care, 
such as substance abuse, imprisonment, and domestic violence, are not amenable to 
speedy resolution. Under ASFA, each of these problems might form the basis for 
termination of a mother’s rights as soon as the fifteen month period expires, even if 
the child could potentially be kept safe in the home with sufficient services. Some 
children whose mothers have such problems might be better served by preservation 
of the parental bond than by termination. An individualized determination of the 
child’s best interests would weigh such factors as the child’s age, the specific nature 
of the mother-child relationship, demonstrated harm to the child, and the identified 
placement alternatives. Because ASFA imposes a categorical imperative that 
parental rights be terminated after the passage of a certain amount of time, it does 
not appear to permit the exercise of judicial discretion in response to the best 
interests of those children who would be better off retaining a legal relationship 
with their mothers (G.A.O., 2002). 
 
  
 
3.1. Substance Abuse 
 
Substance abuse is highly correlated with child neglect and abuse. When Congress 
adopted ASFA, it noted that, along with poverty, substance abuse is “one of the 
three most common reasons for children entering foster care” (H. R., 1997, p. 19). It 
estimated that substance abuse occurs in “up to 80% of substantiated abuse and 
neglect cases.” Both alcohol dependency and regular use of illegal substances show 
a high correlation with child neglect~ although direct causation has not been 
demonstrated (Egami, 1996). The General Accounting Office reports that most 
children in foster care have at least one parent who abuses one or more illegal drugs 
such as cocaine, methamphetamnines or heroin, and most parents who use illegal 
substances have done so for five years or more, suggesting that they will not be 
readily amenable to rehabilitation (G.A.O., 1998). 
The common relationship between the removal of children from their homes and 
a variety of biases involving race, class and other norms, noted above, may also be 
implicated in child welfare cases involving substance abuse (Roberts, 2002; Ross, 1 
999a, b). It is, however, misguided to ignore the pernicious effects that parental 
substance abuse may have on children, regardless of the precise substance of choice 
(Bartholet, 1999). Substance abuse can alter judgment, diminish impulse control, 
and stimulate aggression. At the core of the problem, substance abuse may make it 
impossible for a parent to perceive — much less respond to — a child’s needs. The 
inability to perceive the world around her accurately often interferes with the 
parent’s ability to minister to the child’s most basic needs. As one teenager 
reflected, looking back on a substance-abusing mother, “I realize that drugs were 
more important than me, that I didn’t come first in my mother’s life. She wasn’t 
worried about if I ate or where I slept — she was more worried about drugs” 
(National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA), 1999, p. 18). Another 
teen summarized her experience with a substance-abusing mother, saying, “She was 
always off doin’ her own thing. She wasn’t even really a mom” (CASA, 1999, p. 
16). 
For purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to enter into the debate over 
whether substance abuse has its genesis in illness, is a rational response to stress, or 
results from moral failings. From the perspective of the ASFA timeline, the critical 
issue is that “parents are frequently ordered to undergo drug treatment or other 
counseling as a condition to regaining custody of a child in foster care. Given the 
realities of limited funding, it is not uncommon for there to be waiting lists to 
receive such services” (In re H. G., 2001, p. 872). Thirty-nine of the 46 states that 
responded to a recent federal survey reported that they lacked sufficient drug 
treatment programs (G.A.O., 1998). The dearth of services is even more 
pronounced for women than for men (H. H. 5., 1999). Social workers report that 
many women feel trapped — they fear that if they voluntarily enter a treatment 
program, they run the risk that their children will be removed from them and placed 
  
in foster care (CASA, 1999). Policies that result in forced separation of children 
from mothers who enter treatment programs run counter to research suggesting that 
mothers who are able to keep their children while in treatment are more likely to 
complete treatment successfully (Friedland, 2000). 
Even where services are available, substance abusers often require several 
courses of treatment before they stop relapsing (and some never succeed in breaking 
the cycle of addiction or significantly improve their ability to function) (Denzin, 
1987). From the vantage point of a mother’s parental rights, this suggests that when 
the state removes children because of neglect stemming from a mother’s substance 
abuse, the 15-month clock is likely to run before a mother can establish that she has 
successfully completed treatment. The running of the clock is of equal concern from 
the child’s point of view if it means that the child loses the chance to have a sound 
relationship with a parent because timely, comprehensive treatment is not available 
for that parent. 
The likelihood that a mother will regain custody of a child who has entered the 
child welfare system is further diminished if the mother is incarcerated as a result of 
her abuse of illegal substances. As many as 80% of incarcerated women are 
mothers, and most of those are single mothers (Downey, 2001). Nearly two-thirds 
of women in state prisons report that their children lived with them until they were 
incarcerated (Mumola, 2000). If a woman is in prison because of drug related 
offenses, the court may have been required to sentence her under mandatory 
sentencing guidelines without discretion to consider the impact of the sentence on 
her children. Such la?ws have an unintended disparate impact on mothers and 
fathers. When men who live with their children enter prisons, over 90% report that 
the children remain with the child’s other parent; only 1% of children of male 
inmates enter foster care (Acoca & Raeder, 1998). In stark contrast, only 28% of 
women prisoners report that their children are living with the children’s father 
(Mumola, 2000). Although over half of the children of women prisoners live with 
grandparents or other relatives, nearly 10% of women prisoners report that their 
children have entered foster care — putting them at risk of termination of parental 
rights since the average mother in a state prison is expected to remain there for 49 
months (Mumola, 2000). 
If applied mechanistically, the 15/22 months rule would be a death knell for the 
parental rights of all parents with children in foster care who remain in jail for more 
than a year and a half. Unfortunately, effective treatment programs for women 
involved with the criminal justice system are virtually non-existent. From the 
vantage point of the incarcerated mother who wishes to retain a relationship with 
her child, the state’s reliance on the 15/22 months rule seems patently unfair. As 
one women’s advocate explained, “[flor many inmates, children are a life-sustaining 
force. To break that bond is a punishment of the worst kind” (Acoca & Raeder, 
1999, p. 136). In order to avoid categorical severance of the parental rights of all 
incarcerated women, courts could perform an individualized assessment. Such an 
assessment could examine the mother’s fault and predict her future behavior by 
  
looking at such factors as whether she has pursued opportunities for treatment, 
cooperated with and completed services that were made available, relapsed and 
tested positive for drugs, experienced further arrests, and whether she used every 
available means to maintain contact with her child (such as writing letters, calling 
and seeking visits). Under ASFA the incarcerated mother could permanently lose 
her parental rights even if she made every feasible effort to rehabilitate herself, 
communicate with her children or have them visit her in jail. This happened to a 
Nevada woman who had no substance abuse problems and had provided a stable 
home for her children for several years. She was serving a sentence for violating the 
conditions of her parole on an old conviction for forging checks, after her boyfriend 
turned her in to authorities for leaving the state without permission. The mother 
fulfilled every condition of her case plan that could be accomplished while she was 
in prison, maintained contact with her children and the child welfare agency, and 
was scheduled to be released no later than 11 months after the trial court terminated 
her rights. Fortunately, she was able to file an appeal, and the state’s highest court 
restored her parental rights, which it found had been terminated “solely based ‘on 
the passage of time’ “(In the Matter of J. L. N., 2002, p. 960). Other women are also 
likely to find that the 15/22 months have expired while they remained in prison. 
Even where courts insist that the state establish a ground for termination other 
than the passage of time, incarceration is likely to contribute to termination under 
more generalized theories of fault. Appellate courts in several states have expressly 
held that termination may not be based solely on the parent’s incarceration. In most 
instances, however, courts treat incarceration as a factor in determining whether the 
parent will be able to resume parenting obligations, looking at “factors being related 
to incarceration” rather than deciding to terminate parental rights based “solely” on 
the fact of incarceration (In re Brettany M., 2002; In re Dependency of J. W, 1998; 
in re P 0. M., 2002; In re R. P, 1993; In the Matter of J. L. N., 2002; Johnson v. Ark. 
Dept. of Human Services, 2002). 
Commentators have largely overlooked two recent changes to the federal law, 
which courts are likely to erroneously view as “factors being related to incarcera-
tion” bearing on a mother’s ability to resume parenting responsibility. First, as part 
of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) legislation (commonly 
referred to as “welfare reform”), Congress “stipulated that persons convicted of a 
state or federal felony offense involving the use or sale of drugs are subject to a 
lifetime ban on receiving cash assistance and food stamps” (Allard, 2002, p. 1). 
Forty-two states are enforcing the ban in full or in part and, although it applies only 
to benefits for the mother, it is likely to diminish the household income of paroled 
drug offenders significantly and result in the mother’s “neglect” of children who 
have been returned to her. 
In a second development, the federal government authorized local Public 
Housing Authorities to obtain criminal records and to use information about drug 
convictions to deny public housing to people who either have a conviction or are 
“suspected of drug involvement” (Allard, 2002, p. 12). This provision not only bars 
  
mothers convicted of drug offenses from obtaining public housing, it also means 
that they cannot stay with relatives in public housing without subjecting their hosts 
to the risk of eviction. The combined blow of a lifetime ban on welfare benefits and 
lack of access to public housing severely diminishes the prospect that a mother 
newly released from prison will be able to convince authorities that she can provide 
a safe home for her children. Since ASFA provides that the state does not have to 
engage in “reasonable efforts” after a child has been in foster care for 15 out of 22 
months, the poverty often associated with a mother’s status as a drug offender may 
be transformed into an unwarranted justification for permanently severing her from 
her children. 
In the absence of broader social reform, however, termination because a rela-
tionship has withered while a parent is in prison fulfills ASFA’s intention to require 
the law to look at foster care through the child’s eyes. From the viewpoint of a 
young child, it may not matter why her mother is unable to care for her. What 
matters is that whatever stability she once had has been disrupted, her mother has 
not been her primary psychological parent and, perhaps (if she is lucky), someone 
else now occupies that place in her life. 
Conflict between the needs of the child and the desires of the parent may be 
brought to a head even before termination is an issue. The mother may have a right 
to maintain her relationship with her child even while using drugs or incarcerated, 
but the child may have an equally strong claim not to have contact with a parent if 
such contact is more harmful than beneficial. Consider, for example, a young child 
in a stable, pre-adoptive foster home about whom I was consulted. He has no 
memory of either of his drug-addicted parents. One parent — who is still addicted 
to crack — has vanished, and cannot be located by the child welfare agency. The 
other parent, who is in prison on charges related to drugs and has not seen the child 
for several years, requests that the agency bring the child for a visit and the agency 
complies. As a result of contact with his virtually unknown parent in jail, the child 
experiences severe developmental setbacks. These setbacks include rage, severe 
enuresis, and other behavioral manifestations so pronounced that the foster parents 
reconsider whether they want to adopt the boy, ultimately asking the agency to 
remove him from their home. Meanwhile, the parent is granted parole, expects to be 
released shortly, and seeks custody (see also Dependency of 
I. W, 1998). 
How should a court respond to an absent parent’s demands for continued visi-
tation and custody? The child’s best interests must weigh heavily in the decision, 
but that is not necessarily a sufficient response to the claims of parental rights, 
especially if the parent has completed drug counseling and was a model prisoner. 
On the other hand, it is hard to imagine how a parent newly released from prison, 
without an apartment or a job, whose kin were not available to care for the boy 
when the parent was sentenced, will be able to handle the stresses of parenting a 
demanding child while seeking to adjust to life after prison. These conflicting 
priorities of mothers’ rights and children’s needs may be irreconcilable both as a 
  
matter of generally applicable law and as applied to specific cases. Congress con-
cluded that such conflicts must be resolved in favor of the child’s needs, whether or 
not the mother is at “fault” in the sense of intent, omission or other facts suggesting 
accountability as opposed to strict liability. When a court is confronted with such a 
choice, the child’s interest outweighs the parent’s claim because the legislature has 
made it clear that the consequences of any other decision are too harmful to the 
child and, ultimately, to society (In re Doe, 1994, McMorrow, J., dissenting). As the 
State of Washington’s highest court pronounced even prior to the ASFA regime, 
“when the rights of parents and the welfare of their children are in conflict, the 
welfare of the minor children must prevail” (In re K. R., 1995, p. 146). 
This child-centered view does not depend on any interpretation of mothers as 
good or bad, self-sacrificing or seLfish. It reflects the law’s intervention as defender 
of those least able to protect themselves. The law presumes that adult women can 
rise to their own defense even if they have been victimized, but that children cannot. 
Even within that framework, however, the principle of balancing irreconcilable 
claims in favor of the child rather than the mother should not allow the law to 
sidestep the analytical question of how to reconcile placing children first with the 
liberty interests of parents, as it attempts to do under ASFA’s 15/22 month rule. 
In the final section of this paper I turn to a category of cases involving domestic 
violence, in which the independent but mutually supportive interests and liberty 
claims of mother and child may remain congruent in the face of the challenge the 
15/22 month rule poses to their ability to survive as a family. 
 
3.2. Battered Mothers and Their Children 
 
A large number of incarcerated women, presumably including some of the jailed 
substance abusers discussed in the previous section, have experienced domestic 
abuse (Cahn, 2003). But many other victims of domestic violence who have no 
history of drug abuse, have never been imprisoned and have neither abused nor 
neglected their children, the women who are the focus of this section, are also at 
risk of having their children removed from their care. Advocates for battered 
women and their children have succeeded in promoting the widespread realization 
that children who witness domestic violence are its victims even if the children do 
not suffer physical trauma themselves (ABA, 1994; Edelson, 1999). This 
development, however, had an unanticipated effect when it resulted in the removal 
of children from battered mothers who had succeeded in protecting them from 
witnessing any abuse, or who had successfully extricated themselves from their 
relationships with their abusers (Gische, 2000). 
Mothers who are victims of domestic violence too often become the subjects of 
“double abuse,” in the words of District Court Judge Jack Weinstein: first by a 
partner and then by the state “through forced unnecessary separation of the mothers 
from their children on the excuse that this sundering is necessary to protect the 
children” (Nicholson V. Williams, 2002, p. 163). In re Nicholson (2002), a case that 
  
should become a landmark, Judge Weinstein considered the claims of a class of 
battered mothers whose children were deemed neglected by the New York City 
Administration for Children’s Services (the City) solely because the mother was a 
victim of domestic abuse. (The court also considered the claims of a court-created 
subclass of their children.) Judge Weinstein reflected early on that the case involved 
“three sometimes conflicting principles”: 
 
First, as a parent, a mother has rights to uninterrupted custody of her children and a child has 
rights to remain with parents; within wide limits, adults and children in a household are immune 
from state prying and intrusion. Second, domestic abuse — particularly if physical — of a mother or 
child will not be tolerated. Third, the state has the obligation to protect children from abuse, 
including, where clearly necessary to protect the child, the power to separate the mother and 
child (p. 164). 
 
The court held that the City had violated the right of mothers and children to live 
together (the first principle) by misconstruing its mandate not to tolerate domestic 
abuse (the second principle) and by unjustifiably relying on that mandate when it 
misused its power to separate children from their mothers in order to protect the 
children from abuse (the third principle). 
The ten women named as plaintiffs in Nicholson display remarkable similarities. 
Not one plaintiff mother had struck or physically abused her child. Indeed, the 
definition of the class omitted battered mothers who had abused their children or 
were still failing to protect their children from abusers. In each instance, one or 
more children were removed from a battered mother either because the batterer had 
also attacked the child (and the mother had “failed to protect the child”), or more 
commonly, because the mother either had not extricated herself from the abusive 
situation or, in the process of trying to separate from her abuser, entered a 
transitional situation that was not deemed appropriate for the child (such as no 
longer having an apartment to live in). In many instances, mothers included in the 
class had been charged with neglect or abuse based on strict liability, even though 
their children had not witnessed the abuse and had not suffered either physical or 
emotional harm in the mother’s home. 
The sharp parallels to the problems that ASFA’s 15/22 months rule creates for 
mothers with histories of substance abuse, discussed above in Part 3.1, are readily 
apparent, including the reluctance of many mothers to seek help (even if it were 
available) due to fear that scrutiny will lead to removal of the children from the 
mother’s home (Lemon, 1999). Mothers who are victims of domestic violence, 
however, have an even stronger argument than substance abusers that they are not 
“at fault,” especially in light of the many obstacles to separating from an abusive 
situation. These obstacles include the increased physical danger to the woman and 
her children in the period immediately following her departure, the lack of domestic 
violence shelters, an inability to find permanent housing, and a lack of employment 
(Kintzel, 2002). 
The published opinions in the case mention ASFA only once, in the context of 
  
the complex interacting federal, state and local statutes and regulations implicated 
by the issues in the case (Nicholson, 2001). The interaction of the City’s treatment 
of abused mothers and the ASFA time line was not an issue in Nicholson, and the 
record does not indicate that any of the named class representatives in Nicholson 
suffered the termination of parental rights (perhaps in part because they were well 
represented once they became part of the class). But the issues of removal, passage 
of time, and delay are likely to mean that some proportion of mothers who are 
victims of domestic violence will lose their children permanently, for no other 
reason than that City agencies acted with “benign indifference” while the clock ran 
to 15 months (2002, p. 163). In an interim opinion on Nicholson, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that a serious substantive due process question 
would arise if a child were removed from a “blameless” parent and asked the State’s 
courts to determine “whether removing a child from a battered mother serves the 
interests of the child” (Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 2003, pp. 173—174). The matter is 
still pending. 
In considering the Second Circuit’s question, New York’s highest court should 
acknowledge the child’s independent interest in remaining with his or her mother 
and siblings. Under some circumstances, where the child seeks to maintain a 
relationship and the child’s safety can be assured, the child’s interest in preserving 
at least a legal relationship with a biological family constitutes a corollary of the 
mother’s interest in preserving her parental rights. But ASFA ignores the child’s 
potential claim. It imposes a legal presumption that every child who has been in fos-
ter care for 15 out of 22 months would be better off severing ties with her biological 
parents and moving into a new permanent situation, unless the case falls within one 
of the three enumerated exceptions. The statute assumes that although the natural 
parent may continue to speak legally for the child until the termination proceedings 
are completed, the state, advocating termination, more accurately represents the 
child’s best interest, and does not provide the child with an independent voice. In 
many, or even most, instances, the state may indeed express the child’s real inter-
ests, especially in cases involving physical abuse of the child. But ASFA leaves no 
discretion for taking into account that some individual children (especially those of 
“blameless” parents) may have a liberty interest in preserving their natural families. 
(The sole exception under ASFA involves older adolescents who may refuse to 
consent to adoption.) 
The psychological and emotional detriment to a child who is separated un-
necessarily from a parent (and siblings) has been well documented (Arredondo & 
Edwards, 2000). The child suffers the trauma of separation, leading to such 
symptoms as fear, anxiety, depression, a diminished sense of self and regressive 
behavior. For children separated from their mothers because of domestic violence, 
all of the symptoms associated with loss occur at the same time that the child 
“confront[s] an unfamiliar and often dangerous foster care system,” including the 
frequent pattern of separation from friends, neighborhood and school (Nicholson, 
2002, p. 253). Children frequently believe that they are responsible for the breaknp 
  
of the family following domestic violence just as they do in cases of divorce. The 
intensity of those feelings may be exaggerated where the state intercedes due to do-
mestic violence because the child does not know whether the battered parent is safe. 
But experts suggest that separating a child from an abused mother may be compared 
“to pouring salt on an open wound” (Nicholson, 2002, p. 199). When children who 
are safe with their mothers experience removal as aggravating their fears, the state’s 
claim that removal serves the child’s best interests is materially undermined. 
The right of a mother and child to remain together arguably does not belong to 
the mother alone. The Second Circuit recognized a “right to the preservation of 
family integrity encompassing the reciprocal rights of both parent and children a 
quarter of a century ago in Duchesne v. Sugarman (1977), and reiterated what it 
termed a “fundamental right” to “remain together” in 1999 (Tenenbaum v. Williams, 
p. 600). Finding a “mutual interest in an interdependent relationship,” the Court of 
Appeals identified what it labeled “consistent support” in Supreme Court decisions 
concerning the rights of parents (Duchesne, 1977, p. 825). In Nicholson, Judge 
Weinstein expanded this doctrine by enunciating an interest in “familial integrity,” 
which guarantees all family members a right not to be separated from each other 
(2002, pp. 233—234). 
Supreme Court opinions skirt the issue but offer some support for the argument 
that the liberty interest is reciprocal. In Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989), for 
example, the plurality expressly noted that the Court “never had occasion to decide 
whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in 
maintaining her filial relationship” and declined to do so in what it construed as a 
case involving a claim to preserve a child’s relationships with two “fathers,” one 
biological and the other — the mother’s husband — statutory (pp. 130—131). In a 
compelling dissent Justice Brennan went a step further. He recognized that the 
relationship between the biological father and his child constituted “a liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause,” and acknowledged the child’s claim 
that she too had a “liberty interest” in that relationship (p. 151). Most recently, 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Troxel v. Granville, reiterated that “this court has not 
yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child’s liberty interests in preserving 
established familial or family-like bonds.. .“ But, he continued, “it seems to me 
extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty 
interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these 
interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation” (Troxel, 
2000, p. 2072). 
The significance of a child’s bonding to only one primary caretaker was central 
to the classic “psychological parent” model promulgated by Goldstein, Freud and 
Solnit (Goldstein et al., 1996). Their theories, which have proven so influential in 
federal and judicial decision making about child welfare issues, are not without 
critics. Some authors, for example, suggest that patterns of “multiple attachments” 
hold promise for children (Davis, 1996). Such an approach would bolster Justice 
Brennan’s willingness to entertain the viability of a two-father paradigm and 
  
supports the more general notion that children benefit from a network of stable 
attachments. A modification to the single psychological parent approach, suggested 
by a doctor and an eminent juvenile court judge, proposes that child welfare 
decisions focus on what they term “reciprocal interconnectedness,” considering the 
spectrum of relationships between children and their caregivers (Arredondo & 
Edwards, 2000). Under this proposal, a court would weigh the parent’s attachment 
to the child as well as the child’s attachment to the parent, focusing on the 
interrelatedness between the particular child and his or her various caregivers. 
I have argued in a variety of other contexts that children may have liberty inter-
ests independent of their parents, and that the law should take the young person’s 
expression of those interests seriously (Ross, 1996, 1999a, b). Applied to ASFA, 
this argument suggests that where child and parent each assert a complementary 
independent liberty interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, the court 
should weigh the child’s argument heavily. Despite its intended focus on the child, 
ASFA, as currently designed, does not afford courts the opportunity to take the 
individual child’s views into account. Allowing a child’s views to be heard does not 
mean that the child’s preferences will trump all other arguments. Among other 
things, even seriously abused children frequently have strong feelings of attachment 
to their abusers, and the child’s safety must remain paramount. 
Existing sibling relationships may be a factor in the resistance some older 
children mount to adoption because termination of parental rights also terminates 
the legal relationship between siblings who may be placed separately. Many 
children in foster care have indicated that one of the most painful parts of their 
expenence was the loss of siblings (Ross, 1999a, b). When one sibling is adopted, 
and others remain in foster care, they often lose touch with each other completely. 
Termination also severs ties with other blood relatives including grandparents, 
aunts, and uncles, with whom the child may have a beneficial relationship of long 
standing. 
Some young people are sophisticated enough to fight to retain important family 
ties. One 14-year-old resisted an adoptive placement that involved moving out of a 
foster home in which he had resided for eight years. He insisted that his younger 
sister needed him and talked about setting up a household in which he and his sister 
could live together. He fantasized that if the parental rights of his severely 
neglectful and detached mother were terminated, he would claim custody of his 
sister from wherever she had been placed when he graduated from the system at age 
eighteen. Responding to the state’s notion that he could no longer linger in the legal 
limbo of foster care for the four years that remained of his minority, he stated 
simply, “the law is retarded.” He may have been too harsh. But in this instance 
perhaps the law may be described as “doctrinally challenged.” 
The complexity of parental termination cases may not be amenable to the 
attractive simplicity of a timeline or any other mechanistic solution. It may not be 
possible to respond categorically to the needs of all vulnerable children. The 
application of general principles to specific cases may be more likely to lead to 
  
sensitive decisions about each neglected child. This approach would not require us 
to throw out the ASFA reforms, but rather would call for continued tinkering. The 
ultimate goal should be to replace blanket presumptions — whether they favor 
parents, as in the old regime, or children, as in the ASFA regime — with nuanced 
appraisals of individual relationships that enable judges to respond to the individual 
child who is, under ASFA, the proper focus of any termination proceeding. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Termination and permanency call upon decision makers to exercise delicate 
judgments in which they take cognizance of two competing visions of the rights of 
children: the right of each individual child to be nurtured, and the autonomy rights 
of the each child, which will not always support the same result. In the child welfare 
context, children clearly have a right to be protected and cared for, if not by their 
parents, then through the state’s intervention. As much as children need to be taken 
care of, simple substitution of one paternalistic presence (the state) for another (the 
biological parent) may not be sufficiently responsive to children’s claims. Just as 
ASFA recognizes that children’s interests may diverge from those of their parents, 
so too may the interests of children diverge from the presumptions enunciated by 
the state. From the perspective of rights theory, children often have both a 
procedural and substantive interest in preserving family relationships that benefit 
them and an equally strong claim to be legally free to join a new family where the 
facts warrant it. 
If we lived in a world where no child was ever removed unnecessarily, every 
child who was removed returned home as soon as basic safety could be assured, and 
well-designed services were available to all who needed them, then a sound legal 
ground for termination would generally exist after the passage of 15 months. In 
such a hypothetical world, one whose existence ASFA presumes, the state would be 
able to demonstrate the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence 
without relying on the mere passage of time. In this hypothetical universe, by the 
time the state filed for termination of parental rights the claims of mother and child 
would usually be at odds just as ASFA presumes them to be. 
In the messier world that mothers and children actually inhabit, cases at the 
margins elude easy solutions. These marginal cases raise two separate and equally 
important legal problems. First, the mother’s constitutional interests in her rela-
tionship with her child require that the state establish clear individualized grounds 
for termination. The passage of time, without more, does not appear to satisfy the 
heavy burden imposed on the state. Second, the child in any individual case may be 
better off retaining a legal relationship with her mother. Thus, the court considering 
a petition for termination should be required to hear any arguments a child offers for 
preserving the relationship and should have discretion to take those arguments into 
  
account. Both of these issues may be addressed if courts are required to assess the 
likelihood that an individual parent will be a fit or unfit parent for the individual 
child in the near future, rather than relying solely on a categorical 15-month rule. 
The irrebuttable presumption embedded in ASFA’s 15/22 month rule fails to do 
justice to every mother and every child that appear in a termination proceeding. The 
rule prevents courts from considering the narratives of each individual mother and 
child and of their unique relationship. It ignores context in favor of a bright line 
rule. In accounting for a child’s sense of time and need for continuity, the resolution 
of each child’s case requires consideration of the individual child’s unique 
strengths, vulnerabilities, personal history and desires. The law, a crude instrument 
at best, needs to endeavor to respond flexibly to the minority of cases in which an 
individual child would be better off returning to his or her mother even after the 
passage of time. 
The lack of clear legal grounds for termination under the 15/22 months rule is 
the elephant in the room that no one wants to talk about. The legal grounds for 
termination after 15 months in foster care must be clarified, and the standards must 
address due process concerns. Clarification would reassure both child welfare 
agencies and the courts that hear their termination petitions that “permanent” 
decisions will withstand subsequent judicial review in the rare instances where an 
appeal is filed. Sensitivity to the constitutional stakes for parents is doctrinally 
required. A predictive approach, involving judicial scrutiny of whether a parent is 
likely to be able to resume safe parenting within the child’s time frame, is the test 
least likely to violate constitutional rights. The predictive approach at its best would 
integrate consideration of the child’s best interests with assessment of parental fault 
by asking whether this individual parent would be able to resume parenting 
responsibility for this individual child, considering the child’s specific 
developmental needs and time frame. 
Children whose circumstances diverge from ASFA’s bright line approach to 
termination would benefit from restoration of discretion within the parameters of a 
rebuttable presumption that children who have been in foster care for 15 of the last 
22 months should be legally free to enter a new permanent family. Such restored 
flexibility would enable courts to respond appropriately to individual children 
whose circumstances do not fit the normative model. An approach that incorporates 
this flexibility without giving judges unlimited discretion might even help both 
mother and child come to terms with the court’s decision regardless of who “wins” 
and who “loses” in any given termination proceeding. A clear nexus between the 
passage of time and a constitutionally sufficient showing of parental fault would 
help to insure that the relationship between mother and child is not terminated 
needlessly in cases where their interests converge, and would also enable courts to 
take into account the unique child’s point of view, rather than the viewpoint the 
state imputes to all similarly situated children. 
 
 
  
NOTES 
 
1. A prima facie case is one that “on the face of it” permits a presumption that a 
fact is true unless disproved by evidence to the contrary. 
2. Res ipse loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, is a “doctrine providing that, in 
some circumstances, the mere fact of an accident’s occurrence raises an inference of 
negligence so as to establish a prima facie case” (Garner, 1999, p. 1311). 
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